Blog

The Heritage Foundation’s Sally McNamara and Baker Spring wrote about NATO’s summit, held last weekend in Lisbon, and what must happen with missile defense in light of the newly adopted Strategic Concept and Russia’s agreement to cooperate on missile defense. An excerpt from their web memo:

“The new Strategic Concept adopted by NATO at the Lisbon summit this weekend stated: ‘The greatest responsibility of the Alliance is to protect and defend our territory and our populations against attack, as set out in Article 5 of the Washington Treaty.’[1] Accordingly, NATO has declared missile defense a core competency of the alliance. The 2010 Strategic Concept states that the Alliance will ‘develop the capability to defend our populations and territories against ballistic missile attack as a core element of our collective defence, which contributes to the indivisible security of the Alliance.’[2]

“The development of a transatlantic-wide missile defense architecture will produce an effective defensive strategic posture for the alliance and marks a welcome step forward in terms of addressing the security challenges presented by the post–Cold War world. History will view it as a major milestone in moving the West away from the Cold War policy of maintaining deterrence primarily by the threat of nuclear retaliation for any strategic attack on members of the alliance and toward a policy putting in place defenses to protect its population and territory against such attack.”

With the post-Cold War threat of rogue states like Iran and North Korea, protecting allies is more important than ever. Expanding missile defense in Europe is vital, and McNamara and Baker contend that NATO should honor its June 2011 deadline to implement the plan.

The authors also contend that the former Soviet Union’s contradicts itself by agreeing to cooperate with NATO in expanding missile defense in Europe, while at the same time asserting that START limits U.S. missile defense and “by extension, NATO missile defense options. Russia has threatened to withdraw from START if the U.S. strengthens missile defense in Europe. Since the U.S. is part of NATO, and NATO approved a plan to expand missile defense, will Russia withdraw from START?

“If the Russian pledge to cooperate with the West in the area of missile defense is to have real meaning, the Russians will have to issue three policy statements in addition to accepting the programmatic guidelines listed above:

“1. That Russia no longer sees the development and deployment of robust missile defense capabilities as undermining the strategic balance and believes that moving toward defensive strategic postures will enhance stability in the post–Cold War world;

“2. That Russia accepts the fact that fielding missile defenses capable of countering missiles that are in the hands of third states both now and in the future will necessarily have some capability to counter Russian missiles; and

“3. That Russia understands that the new NATO missile defense policy is a legitimate part of the alliance’s inherent right to collective self-defense and not a threat to Russia.”

As mentioned in the previous post, six Republican senators have asked Secretary of State Hillary Clinton to turn over documents and transcripts related to secret missile defense talks between the U.S. and Russia. A State Department official denied that the two countries are pursuing such an agreement.

The Heritage Foundation’s Baker Spring writes about these talks in his latest web memo:

“It appears that the Obama Administration is challenging the U.S. Senate regarding the ratification of the new strategic arms control treaty with Russia called New START and its potential negative consequences for U.S. missile defense options—so much so that a group of Senators have felt compelled to send an October 18 letter to Secretary of State Hillary Clinton asking for further details. From the outset, the Administration has asserted that New START will not limit the missile defense options of the U.S., including the option to deploy components of a missile defense system in space. The Senate has made it clear that it does not want the agreement with Russia to limit U.S. missile defense options.

“According to a recent report in Bloomberg, however, Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov is claiming that the U.S. and Russia are on the verge of concluding a side agreement[1] that an earlier report in The Washington Times indicates will limit U.S. missile defense options.[2] If so, the Obama Administration’s insistence that the side bargain constitutes a ‘missile defense cooperation agreement’ is cynical at best. Further, it is possible that this side agreement could limit U.S. space capabilities, which has additional negative implications for missile defense.
…
“That the Obama Administration would be engaged in negotiations with Russia on genuine cooperation in the area missile defense should be expected and encouraged.

“It is objectionable, however, to use these negotiations as a cover for doing the opposite of what the Administration advertised—i.e., curtailing missile defenses. As such, there is clear justification for the Senators’ demand that they and their colleagues receive the record of these negotiations.

“For their part, Russian leaders have, on a number of occasions, voiced their view that the U.S. missile defense program is aimed against their country and stated their desire to curtail it. The Obama Administration, for its part, has been less than forthright in its assertions that New START itself does not impose restrictions on U.S. missile defense options. New START contains implied and direct restrictions or impediments to various sections of the U.S. missile defense program…”

Last week we excerpted James Carafano’s op-ed in the San Francisco Examiner about Senator Jim DeMint’s criticism of the new START. Among other things, the senator believes START won’t help protect the country from rogue nations like Iran, and he offered amendments to fix the treaty’s problems.

The Heritage Foundation’s Baker Spring weighed in on the topic. At The Foundry, he writes:

“The Obama Administration has stated on numerous occasions that there is ‘no way, no how’ the New START treaty, a nuclear arms control agreement between the Russian Federation and the United States, will limit U.S. ballistic missile defense options. However, ongoing exchanges of opinions on this question show that the issue is far from clear.

“Reporter Josh Rogin, in his recent critique of an amendment that Senator Jim DeMint (R–SC) offered to the resolution of ratification for New START in the Senate Foreign

Relations Committee (SFRC) disparages the Senator’s effort. DeMint also offered a similar amendment to the defense authorization bill for the FY2011. Rogin’s criticism is, at its core, based on a single, fallacious argument: If you can’t defend against every possible missile that could target America, why even bother? Rogin’s critique also implies that some proponents of New START want to limit missile defense.

“Even if Rogin doesn’t understand why we should make sure we are able, under New START, to deploy the best missile defenses possible, the SFRC obviously does. That’s why it included a modified version of the amendment in its resolution of ratification by voice vote backed by Senator Jim Webb (D–VA), Senator Bob Corker (R–TN) and others.

“As it stands, New START does little to ensure that the United States and Russia are able to protect and defend the people, territory, infrastructure, and institutions of both countries, and of their respective allies. Both amendments attempted to fix this flaw. The version of the amendment adopted by the committee states that a paramount obligation of the U.S. government is to provide for the defense of the American people, its forward-deployed troops, and U.S. allies. Moreover, it states that arms control policies based on the theory of mutual assured destruction (MAD) can be contrary to the safety and security of both the U.S. and Russia.”

An excerpt of Baker Spring’s backgrounder at Heritage:

“The Treaty Between the Russian Federation and the United States of America on Measures for the Further Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms (New START), which was signed on April 8, 2010, is fundamentally flawed. While New START contains a variety of specific flaws, the more important flaws are general and result from the Obama Administration’s misguided approach to deterrence and arms control.

“However, the fundamental flaws with New START should not lead to the conclusion that arms control cannot play a helpful role in securing U.S. vital interests in the post–Cold War world. As during the Cold War, there is a right way and a wrong way to negotiate arms control treaties and execute such treaties after they enter into force. The right way to pursue arms control is to observe the principle of negotiating from a position of strength. This enduring principle suggests what alternative arms control treaties and other agreements the U.S. should seek if the U.S. Senate recognizes the fundamental flaws with New START and rejects the treaty.[1][2]

“Finding an effective alternative to New START begins with the recognition that today’s world with emerging new independent nuclear weapons powers demands a different concept of strategic deterrence than what was applied during the Cold War. This new concept of deterrence relies on the federal government seeking to protect and defend the United States and its allies against strategic attacks and convincing would-be adversaries that any attempted attacks will fail to achieve their political and military purposes.[3]

“This concept of deterrence by denial sharply contrasts with the concept of deterrence by the threat of retaliation that was applied during the Cold War. It also sharply contrasts with President Barack Obama’s declared policy of nuclear disarmament in which arms control would become the holistic solution to nuclear security. However, it is unclear how any concept of strategic deterrence, much less the clearly excluded concept based on retaliation with nuclear weapons, would apply to the President’s policy of nuclear disarmament.

“Ultimately, the proper alternative to New START is derived from this underlying concept of deterrence by denial, which leads to the adoption of a protect and defend strategy.”

According to a Washington Post story published last week, the State Department reported that Russia is violating international chemical and biological weapons pacts. An excerpt:

“The new compliance report, obtained by the Washington Post, says that several issues raised in the 2005 version have been resolved, on subjects such as the movement of Russian road-mobile missiles and inspection of reentry vehicles. But the report may nonetheless fuel the debate over the new treaty, because it says a number of other compliance issues remained unresolved when the treaty expired last December. The unclassified version of the report does not identify them. To pass, the treaty will need at least eight Republican votes plus those of all 57 Democrats and the two independents. Most Republicans haven’t yet indicated which way they will go. In recent weeks, the battle over the treaty has intensified, with the Heritage Foundation launching a nationwide campaign against it, and former presidential candidate Mitt Romney branding it Obama’s ‘worst foreign policy mistake.”

The Heritage Foundation‘s Baker Spring comment on the issue:

“The State Department is sorely upset about July 28 headlines in the Washington Post and the Washington Times about a recent Department report on Russian noncompliance with several existing and past arms control treaties and how the Russian record could derail Senate approval of the new arms control treaty with Russia , which is called New START. It seems, however, that the State Department cannot keep its story straight.

“According to a report in Foreign Policy’s online journal “The Cable,” Assistant Secretary of State Rose Gottemoeller asserts that Russian non-compliance with New START’s predecessor treaty, simply called START, was about minor technical issues.  On the other hand, a State Department official speaking off the record is quoted as saying, “As far as State is concerned, cheating in any form would be a huge issue… so it absolutely would be something we would take very seriously.”

“So which is it?”

Cross posted from The Daily Caller:

Responding to James Carafano’s July 29 critique of New START, William Hartung asserts that the proposed nuclear arms treaty imposes no limitations on U.S. missile defense options. It’s a faithful parroting of the administration line.  But given Hartung’s longstanding views regarding missile defense, arms control and nuclear disarmament, this argument—coming from him—is quite disingenuous.

Should New START enter into force, it is a virtual certainty that—excepting only the government of Russia—Hartung would be the first in line to state that improving U.S. missile defense capabilities is incompatible with the terms of the treaty.  His argument that New START imposes no restrictions on missile defense is only a temporary—and rather transparent—expedient to encourage Senate ratification of the treaty.

At the heart of the debate over missile defense and New START is the language in its preamble.  This language prohibits defensive capabilities that have the potential to undermine the “viability and effectiveness” of Russia’s strategic nuclear force.  Hartung argues that language in the preamble is not legally binding.  That’s highly questionable.  But even if true, the language is certainly morally and politically binding.

There’s also the problem of imprecision.  The meaning of the phrase “viability and effectiveness” depends on circumstance and is in the eye of the beholder.  For example, if the Russians decide to predicate their strategic nuclear force on the basis of a first strike option, they may freely claim that U.S. missile defense capabilities undermine the viability and effectiveness of its strategic nuclear force.  After all, nothing complicates first strike options like effective missile defense.

More likely, the Russians will argue that U.S. missile defenses jeopardize its retaliatory (“second strike”) strategic nuclear capability.  The central purpose of such a strike would be to kill as many Americans as possible.  Hartung would agree with a Russian assertion that its strategic nuclear force exists to provide a second strike option.  How, then, can he oppose defending the American people, and by extension America’s allies, against a nuclear strike by Russia or any other nuclear-armed state?

There is no good answer to this question.   While he and Carafano clearly disagree about many issues related to arms control, there is one thing they should agree on: the inappropriateness and ineffectiveness of a second strike nuclear deterrence policy.

It is surprising and disturbing that Hartung of all people takes refuge in the argument for a strategic posture that gives both the U.S. and Russia nuclear forces large enough “for either side to destroy the other many times over.”  It’s even more disturbing when you consider that the U.S. must deter potential aggression not just—or even primarily—from Russia, but from an increasing number of newly-armed nuclear states as well.  It falls in the category of small favors, one presumes, that Hartung stops short of applying the logic of second strike deterrence to nuclear-armed terrorists.  In this case, at least, he appears not to object to defensive options.

Hartung ought to try the following thought experiment on for size.  What if New START’s preamble made the following statement: “Mindful of the fact that nuclear disarmament is incompatible with strategic stability because it will undermine the viability and effectiveness of the strategic offensive arms of the Parties….”

Both robust strategic defenses, including missile defenses, and nuclear disarmament are incompatible with second-strike deterrence postures.  That this language is not in the preamble demonstrates only that Hartung’s disingenuousness regarding New START restrictions imposed on the U.S. missile defense program is matched by the Russian government’s disingenuousness regarding the matter of nuclear disarmament.

– Baker Spring is F. M. Kirby Research Fellow in National Security Policy in the Douglas and Sarah Alli­son Center for Foreign Policy Studies, a division of the Kathryn and Shelby Cullom Davis Institute for Inter­national Studies, at The Heritage Foundation.

Last week we mentioned that the U.S. Senate was deliberating on whether to ratify the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START). The Heritage Foundation’s Baker Spring said treaty approval “will turn on whether the Obama Administration’s commitment to modernizing the nuclear weapons infrastructure is adequate in the eyes of the Senate and will be sustained after ratification.” (Source)

If the administration provides no clear-cut answers, the Senate may request the negotiating records  between the two countries. The Heritage Foundation‘s Kim Holmes provides an update on those negotiations. From the Washington Times:

“The Obama administration’s drive to win Senate approval of the New START arms treaty with Russia has hit a speed bump. Several senators are asking to see the secret negotiating record from the administration’s official talks with Russia.

“Why? Because U.S. and Russian officials publicly disagree about what the treaty says. Senators have a right to know – before they consent to ratification of a treaty that affects national security – how those terms now at issue were handled during the negotiations.”

“The differences regarding missile defense are stark. Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov asserts that the treaty links arms reduction to restraint on missile defense and that this linkage is legally binding. Russia, he says, can withdraw from the treaty if  ‘the U.S.’s build-up of its missile defense strategic potential in numbers and quality begins to considerably affect the efficiency of Russian strategic nuclear forces.’”

One side claims there are no restrictions on our missile defense strategy, and the other side believes there are restrictions. Which is it?

“Only a careful review of the negotiating record can set the record straight,” Holmes writes. The president has undermined our defenses and emboldened a resurgent Russia for “the sake of just getting a treaty.”

The U.S. Senate took up the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START) this week. While the Obama administration hopes the Senate will ratify the treaty without a protracted process, missile defense advocates hope senators will ask the right questions and proceed only when they’ve received the answers.

Last month, the U.S. and Russia agreed to reduce deployed warheads to between 1,550, and limit intercontinental ballistic missiles to 700. Shortly after they reached the agreement, Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov said if “the U.S.’s build-up of its missile defense strategic potential in numbers and quality begins to considerably affect the efficiency of Russian strategic nuclear forces,” Russia would back out of the treaty.

The Heritage Foundation’s Baker Spring says START approval “will turn on whether the Obama Administration’s commitment to modernizing the nuclear weapons infrastructure is adequate in the eyes of the Senate and will be sustained after ratification.” (Source)

If the administration provides no clear-cut answers, the Senate may request the negotiating record between the two countries. We’re naturally curious about whatever compromises the president made during his wrangling with the former Soviet Union.

“If a cohesive minority in the Senate can effectively challenge the Obama Administration on New START, even if the Treaty is ultimately approved by the Senate,” Spring writes, “the rest of the Obama Administration’s arms control agenda will be subject to more serious scrutiny.”

An excerpt from The START Follow-on Treaty: Questions the Senate Needs to Ask:

On April 8, President Obama and Russian President Dmitri Mevedev are scheduled to sign the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START) follow-on treaty in Prague. The new treaty will require each side to reduce the number of deployed strategic nuclear warheads to 1,550 and the number of strategic nuclear missile launchers and bombers to 800.

Regardless of whether a particular Senator views this new treaty sympathetically or not, all Senators should agree on at least one point: The ratification and entry into force of this treaty will have profound implications for the security of the United States. Accordingly, Senators will need to ask some probing questions about the treaty in the coming weeks and months.

1. Does the Treaty, Either Directly or Indirectly, Limit the Missile Defense Options of the U.S.?

The fact sheet released by the White House describing the content of the treaty in general terms states that the treaty places no constraints on the U.S. regarding missile defenses. Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov, however, begs to differ. He has stated that if the U.S. exceeds current levels of missile defense systems, then the new treaty will cease to have force. Lavrov also asserts that the limitations on strategic defenses take a legally binding form under the treaty.

Even if this is not the case—and that cannot be certain until the text of the treaty is released—informal linkages to missile defense from the treaty can, as a practical matter, be just as limiting as actual text in the treaty. For example, President Obama established precisely such a linkage by canceling a plan to field defensive interceptors against long-range missiles in Poland and associated radar in the Czech Republic last September.

2. Does the Treaty Limit U.S. Conventional Strategic Strike Systems?

Again, the White House fact sheet says no. The White House assertion is difficult to fathom, however, because the fact sheet states that the treaty will limit both deployed and non-deployed strategic launchers at 800. Thus, such launchers would seem to be applicable against the numerical limit—whether or not they are armed with nuclear warheads.

If launchers are subject to the numerical limitation regardless, then the treaty by definition imposes a limitation on U.S. options for fielding conventional strategic strike systems.

Last week, we blogged about the conflict between the Pentagon and the Army regarding the Medium Extended Air Defense System (MEADS). The Pentagon wants to continue developing the system with Germany and Italy, and the Army wants to ditch the project, citing the system’s cost. MEADS is a mobile system designed to intercept short-range cruise missiles and shoot down planes and drones. The system uses Lockheed Martin’s Patriot PAC-3 missile and the long-range IRIS-T air-to-air missile.

The $19 billion MEADS project began over 10 years ago, and it’s intended to replace the Army’s aging Patriot system. In addition to the system’s cost, says the Army, it’s taking too long to build it, and it will be hard to manage. The Army will decide whether to transfer development of MEADS to the Missile Defense Agency (MDA).

The Defense Department was also concerned about souring relations with Germany and Italy if MEADS is canceled. The Heritage Foundation‘s Baker Spring said the system is one that the U.S., Germany, and Italy can use when each has the need. “It’s almost inconceivable to me that the U.S. military would be in an expeditionary operation where it won’t be working with coalition partners in some form or another,” he told the Washington Post.

Defense News reports that Army officials and MDA representatives met last week, but the two did not reach a decision on MEADS. Officials agreed that before they can decide whether to transfer the system from the Army to the MDA, follow-up questions and more analysis were necessary.

A design review of MEADS is scheduled for August 2010.