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Writing at National Review Online, Eric Edelman and Robert Joseph ask why the Senate is in a hurry to ratify the new START, considering that only a few witnesses Senate Republicans requested to testify actually were called to testify. An excerpt:

“This Thursday, Sen. John Kerry, chairman of the Foreign Relations Committee, intends to force a vote on New START, moving the resolution of ratification to the Senate floor for a final vote. Although only a handful of witnesses requested by the Senate minority have been called to testify on the treaty’s merits (we were among them), serious criticisms of the treaty’s shortcomings have nonetheless emerged. Unfortunately, many of the concerns raised, while mentioned in Senator Kerry’s draft resolution of ratification, are not addressed in a manner that is likely to allay critics’ apprehensions.

“Proponents of the treaty are pushing hard for a vote this week, motivated at least in part by the fear that the composition of the Senate will be significantly altered by the November elections — and in a way that could lead to further questioning of the treaty’s provisions and, ultimately, to more demands that shortcomings be fixed before ratification. As just one example, more in-depth examination of the verification provisions could expose the gaps created by concessions on exchanges of telemetry data (which among other things indicate how many reentry vehicles a missile can carry) and on site monitoring of Russia’s missile-assembly facility. To date, treaty supporters have relied on the argument that U.S. security is strengthened simply by having ‘U.S. boots on the ground’ conducting inspections at Russian operational facilities. However, as we know from our experience with North Korea, the fact that inspectors are allowed into a country does not mean we can detect or deter cheating.”

Edelman and Joseph add that Senator Kerry’s resolution doesn’t clearly address concerns Republican senators have with START. He could, if he were committed to bipartisanship, assure these opponents and reiterate to Russia that START won’t limit U.S. missile defense options. The deliberative body has been denied access to the treaty negotiating record, and the Obama administration has not answered questions about a commitment to modernize our nuclear infrastructure.

Writing at National Review Online, Eric Edelman and Robert Joseph lay out a few issues the Senate must address as it deliberates ratifying the new START. For example, witnesses have testified before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee about ambiguities that would allow conflicting interpretations of “the definition and accountability of rail-mobile intercontinental ballistic missiles,” and others are concerned about problems with verification.

“Moreover, had some of the Romney critics attended the Senate Foreign Relations Committee hearing on June 24, they would have heard the authors — both career government civil servants — raise all of the above-mentioned issues, as well as the modernization issues that were addressed in the report of the Strategic Posture Commission. In addition, they expressed worries about the future viability of a resilient triad of nuclear forces (ICBMs, submarine-launched ballistic missiles, and Bombers) under the treaty’s relatively low launcher limit — a limit that will require the U.S., but not Russia, to dismantle launchers.

“We continue to believe that these serious issues must be addressed in a thorough deliberative process — like those that accompanied INF, START I and II, and the 2002 Moscow Treaty — rather than dismissed as political partisanship.”

Edelman and Joseph call for the treaty’s negotiating record, which likely would address of the concerns. Additionally, the Senate must consider U.S. security as it makes a decision. “For instance,” the authors write, “if the rail-mobile-ICBM loophole is as minor a question as proponents claim, it can easily be resolved by either joint statements (by the U.S. and Russian governments) or a unilateral Russian statement that they agree that any new rail-mobile systems will be accountable under the treaty.”

Robert Joseph, a senior scholar at the National Institute for Public Policy and former undersecretary of state for arms control and international security, and Eric Edelman, a distinguished fellow at the Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments and former undersecretary of defense for policy, co-wrote an article for National Review Online about the new START.

They pose questions the Senate should ask when considering the treaty’s ratification and discuss whether it weakens America’s security. The authors believe it does.

“In particular, the Senate must examine a number of central questions raised by New START and the NPR. Do the contemplated actions put the country on the right path to deal with the most serious and pressing threats the nation faces? Does New START meet the standards for improving predictability and strategic stability that were used to measure earlier treaties? How real are the reductions being proposed? Will New START lead, as the administration has suggested, to Russia and others working more closely with the U.S. to produce “crippling” sanctions on Iran? Most important, will the treaty and NPR allow for the necessary modernization of our nuclear stockpile and for the capabilities we need, such as robust missile defense and conventional, prompt global strike?

“Despite claims by the administration that the treaty will reduce by 30 percent the number of nuclear warheads each side is permitted to deploy (from 2,200 to 1,550, a net reduction of 650), the numbers are really smaller, since both the U.S. and Russia were moving towards force levels significantly lower than those permitted under the 2002 Strategic Offensive Reductions Treaty negotiated by President Bush, which reduced the levels by almost 4,000 warheads. Moreover, some of the claimed reduction is an artifact of a revised counting rule. In fact, because a bomber will now be counted as one warhead no matter how many bombs or cruise missiles it carries, the agreement may be the first of its kind to permit an actual increase in fielded warhead levels. Furthermore, as some analysts have suggested, the treaty may contain a startling loophole, large enough to drive a train through, which would not count ICBM launchers on rail-mobile platforms. Given past and present Russian interest in such forces, the Senate must certainly determine whether such a gap exists and, if it does, fix it.”

The former Soviet Union appears to be using START as leverage against the U.S. Reducing weapons is a riskier proposition for us, and less so for Russia. Given the arms deal between Russia and Iran, and Russia’s refusal to stand for tougher sanctions against Iran, it’s strange that we’ve allowed ourselves to give up so much while our former Cold War adversary gives up so little.

Joseph and Edelman urge the Senate to carefully examine the treaty and to ask the right questions. Signing the treaty was only the beginning. The Senate must keep security of the homeland a top priority and consider START’s short-term and long-term consequences.