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The Heritage Foundation‘s Peter Brookes and Owen Graham drilled down and discuss the important concerns about the new START. An excerpt:

“Significant Limitations

First, there is the Kremlin’s post-signing statement on New START, which says that any ‘qualitative’ or ‘quantitative’ change to American missile defenses would lead to a possible withdrawal of the Russian federation from the treaty. The Russian position clearly indicates that there are irreconcilable differences on treaty interpretation when compared to the U.S. unilateral statement.[2] By this statement, the Russians are effectively forcing the U.S. to choose between improving its missile defenses and keeping the treaty intact. That is a false choice.

“Then, there is the treaty’s preambular language itself, which states:

“Recognizing the existence of the interrelationship between strategic offensive arms and strategic defensive arms [missile defense], that this interrelationship will become more important as strategic nuclear arms are reduced, and that current strategic defensive arms do not undermine the viability and effectiveness of the strategic offensive arms of the Parties.

“Supporters of the treaty dismiss concerns over the preamble, stating that it has no legal standing, “limits nothing” with regard to missile defense, and simply “notes the relationship between the offense and defense, a strategic reality that has been recognized for more than 40 years.” Others, however, see this as a clear restriction on the development of missile defense.

“Adding to incredulity about the treaty is that additional limits on missile defense continue to be revealed. It is worth remembering that the Obama Administration originally asserted that New START would impose no limitations on missile defense but has now backtracked to insist the treaty would have no specific restrictions. Then, Administration officials later ceded that Article V is a restriction but will not affect the Obama Administration’s missile defense plans, which are still under development. (Article V prohibits the conversion of intercontinental ballistic missile [ICBM] and submarine-launched ballistic missile [SLBM] launchers into missile defense launchers.)

“The newest constraint is one on test-target missiles and launchers, which are used to develop and improve missile defense systems. The Obama Administration has yet to address this issue, but testing restrictions are unacceptable and would undermine America’s national security, especially as unforeseen threats develop. American defense policy and capabilities should be adaptable to future security challenges.

“When viewed together, it is clear that New START’s preamble, the Russian unilateral statement, and remarks by senior Russian officials suggest an attempt by Russia to limit or constrain future U.S. missile defense capabilities. This is significant, considering the nuclear and ballistic missile non-proliferation challenges America faces today—and may face in the future.”

Read the full memo.

The Heritage Foundation‘s Ariel Cohen and Owen Graham, a research assistant at the Davis Institute, co-wrote an article for National Review Online that addresses the new START. They contend that the treaty effectively abandons missile defense:

“Dimitri K. Simes, a noted Kremlinologist, president of the Nixon Center, and publisher of The National Interest, reports that high-ranking Russians told him they were assured by senior American officials during negotiations that there was no need to put restrictive language on missile defense in the treaty. Why? Because, the American officials argued, the Obama administration has no intention of moving forward with strategic missile defense. Indeed, Simes writes, U.S. officials argued that explicit provisions restricting U.S. missile defense would be counterproductive as well as unnecessary, since they could cause the Senate to block ratification.

“Despite this effort to convince the Russians that there was no need to limit missile defense, and despite the Obama administration’s repeated assurances to the American public that START would not limit missile defense, the treaty in fact severely limits missile defense, as Baker Spring, a strategic-weapons analyst at the Heritage Foundation, points out. The language in the preamble establishes a logic that missile-defense capabilities must come down in coordination with reductions in offensive strategic weapons. Otherwise, the treaty states, effective defenses will call into question the ‘viability and effectiveness’ of offensive strategic weapons.”

Cohen and Graham note that Russia gave itself an out. If the U.S. builds up missile defenses in Europe, Russia will withdraw from the treaty. They link to the Heritage Foundation’s assessment of START and agree that it doesn’t address Russia’s tactical nuclear weapons, a major threat to Europe.

“Similarly, the new treaty has no limitations on the number of warheads that can be deployed on each Russian missile; it limits only the total number of missiles. This encourages the practice, favored by the Russians, of outfitting missiles with MIRVs (multiple, independently targetable reentry vehicles) — meaning that each missile carries several warheads and can be used to attack multiple targets.”

Read the full article here.

Heritage experts Ariel Cohen, Owen Graham, and Michaela Bendikova co-wrote a blog post on reactions to the new Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START).

The U.S. and Russia agreed to reduce deployed warheads to between 1,550, and limit intercontinental ballistic missiles to 700. Shortly after they reached the agreement, Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov said if “the U.S.’s build-up of its missile defense strategic potential in numbers and quality begins to considerably affect the efficiency of Russian strategic nuclear forces,” Russia would back out of the treaty.

An excerpt of the post:

“Such concerns have prompted some U.S. senators to consider requesting the negotiating record of the treaty and the supporting documents detailing what exactly took place.

“Sparking major attention among arms control, defense, and Russia policy wonks, Dimitri Simes, a prominent Russia expert and President of the Nixon Center, published an article saying that high ranking Russians told him that during negotiations the senior American officials conveyed to the Russian side that there was no reason to put more restrictive language on missile defense in the treaty. This is because the Obama Administration has no intention of moving forward with strategic missile defenses in Europe. In addition, Americans told the Russians that specific restraints in the treaty would only cause the Senate to block its ratification. Senior U.S. officials apparently confirmed this to Simes. Moscow reached this understanding with the White House while the Obama Administration continuously assured the public that the treaty would not limit missile defense.”

Related posts:

• Steven Groves on START
• Peter Brookes on START
• Baker Spring on START