The Missile Defense Agency (MDA) announced on January 31, 2010, that a test of the Ground-based Midcourse Defense (GMD) system for countering long-range missiles that took place over the Pacific Ocean that day failed to destroy the target missile. The initial review suggests that the failure occurred because a new Sea-Based X-Ban radar that was tracking the target missile failed to work as expected. A more detailed review of why the GMD system failed to intercept and destroy the target has been initiated.
It is to be expected that critics of the missile defense program will now call for the program to be terminated. Accordingly, it is appropriate to note that many of these critics oppose the missile defense program for the reason that they view missile defense as complicating the arms control and disarmament agenda they support. For them, this test failure has nothing to do with their opposition to the program. Indeed, they would likely see a successful test as a stronger reason for terminating the program than a failed one.
Regarding the technology, even curtailing, let alone terminating, the GMD program would be shortsighted. Failures in a test program for technology as advanced as the GMD system should be expected. For example, the Navy’s Polaris submarine-launched ballistic missile (SLBM) program suffered numerous test failures in the 1950s. Polaris, however, laid the foundation for the deployment of an SLBM force that was the backbone of the strategic nuclear force that deterred a Soviet nuclear attack for much of the Cold War. Furthermore, it is frequently the case that the scientists, engineers and contractors working on an advanced technology program will learn more from failed tests than successful ones. The proper response to a failed test, like the one on January 31st, is to maintain a robust program that applies the lessons from the failure to advance the program in the future. The alternative is to believe that any advanced technology weapons program can succeed under a circumstance where it is always just one test failure away from termination. If anything, the testing program for the GMD system has been too timid because of concern about negative political reaction to any such failure and inadequate testing budgets. Under this timid approach, the opportunities for dramatic advances in technology are very limited.
Finally, this test was designed to mimic the sort of long-range missile attack on the United States that Iran is likely to be able to mount in the future. The GMD system is the only one currently available to protect U.S. territory against long-range missile attack. If this program is cancelled, the U.S. will again become vulnerable to attacks with long-range ballistic missiles. It is intolerable that the American people would remain so vulnerable. The GMD program needs to continue and companion sea-based ballistic missile defense systems should be advanced to give them the capability to counter long-range missiles for the defense of U.S. territory. Currently, the sea-based systems are capable of countering only short- and intermediate-range missiles. Finally, the U.S. could revive a program pursued during the Reagan and George H.W. Bush Administrations to develop and field space-based ballistic missile defense interceptors. All three steps are necessary if the federal government is going to meet its obligation to provide for the defense of the American people.
>> The U.S. and Israel will engage in a joint missile defense exercise called Juniper Cobra next month, and the Jerusalem Post reports that the U.S. may leave the systems in place afterward. (Source)
Called the largest joint exercise between the two countries, the event will involve testing three ballistic missile defense systems. The Obama administration has turned its back on deploying missile defense shields to Poland and the Czech Republic, and it’s speculated that countries like Israel and Turkey will be alternative sites.
An Israeli defense minister said, “There is some sense in deploying additional systems [in Israel] since the US already has the X-Band radar in the Negev, storehouses with equipment and close cooperation with the IDF.”
>> Defense contractor Raytheon has developed the AN/SPY-5, a multitracking naval radar system that can search, detect, and track surface and air missiles.
Raytheon’s Charles “Tom” Bush said, “SPY-5 is an affordable, effective and reliable radar system that provides critical capabilities for naval forces around the globe. The radar delivers the capabilities of multiple radar systems to counter a broad range of threats in a single, cost-effective solution.” (Source)
In other Raytheon news, the U.S. Navy awarded the contractor a $151 million contract to make 186 Evolved SeaSparrow Missiles (ESSM) and a $210.3 million option to make 225 more missiles. (Source)
From the release:
“Deployed in the U.S. Navy and nine international fleets, ESSM defends the battlespace by delivering ship self-defense firepower against high-G maneuvering anti-ship cruise missiles as well as surface and low-velocity air threats.”
Finally, Raytheon has awarded a $55.7 million sub-contract to Intracom Defense Electronics, a Greek company, to make subsystems for launchers for Patriot air and missile defense systems. The projected completion date of the project is three and a half years. (Source)
Earlier this month we blogged about a report issued by a team of U.S. and Russian scientists, which contended that our planned missile shields in Poland and the Czech Republic would not protect the region from Iran’s missiles. Wrong, says James Carafano. Writing for the National Review Institute, he says:
“[T]he Washington Post’s Joby Warrick and R. Jeffrey Smith…wrote that ‘[m]oreover, if Iran were to build a nuclear-capable missile that could strike Europe, the defense shield proposed by the United States ‘could not engage that missile,’ the report says. The missile interceptors could also be easily fooled by decoys and other simple countermeasures, the report concludes.’ This statement is factually incorrect.
“The report acknowledges that the X-Band radar can ‘collect high-resolution data on each target.’ Thus, the US system would have some capability to distinguish between decoys and warheads. In addition, Iran does not currently have functional decoys. Furthermore, the US has the technical capability to develop countermeasures to the employment of decoys before Iran could field an effective decoy system. Thus, a ground-based system in Europe would be much more effective against an Iranian missile threat than the article suggests…Worse, Warrick and Smith uncritically pass on the reports findings without any dissenting opinion.”
In July, we mentioned that the U.S. was considering deploying missile defense X-band radar to Israel to protect against possible Iranian attacks. Israeli Defense Minister Ehud Barak and Robert Gates, secretary of the U.S. Department of Defense, agreed to “explore” the possibility of sharing missile early warning launch information and funding two projects that would defend against short-range rockets and mortars.
Israeli state radio reported yesterday that the U.S. has carried out its plan to deploy missile defense radar, although a defense ministry spokesperson denied the deployment. The radar has a range of over 1,240 miles and is situated in the country’s south. According to the AFP, the base will be staffed by 120 members of the U.S. Army.
